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The Effect of State Statutes
on the Civil Rights of Convicts
Statutes in all states place restrictions on the civil rights
of those convicted of a felony. Most of these statutes
withhold specific rights, but "civil death statutes" in force
in a minority of jurisdictions purport to impose a gener-
al or blanket proscription on all of the convict's civil
rights. The author of this Note analyzes both types of
statutes and concludes that the general or blanket dep-
rivation statutes should be repealed and replaced with
legislation specifically delineating the rights affected. Af-
ter examining the various statutory methods by which
those rights actually taken from the convict are subse-
quently restored to him, the author also concludes that
all states should adopt the "automatic restoration" ap-
proach now in effect in a minority of states.
INTRODUCTION
A person imprisoned upon conviction of a felony will often lose
more than his freedom; he may lose many of his civil rights, such
as his marital rights, his right to vote, his right to sue, his right to
inherit, and his right to contract. Even more severe, if sentenced
for life imprisonment, he may be declared "civilly dead," which
may result in the termination of his marriage and the distribution
of his property among his heirs. While only a minority of the states
provide for civil death, all states impose some type of statutory re-
striction on a convict's civil rights.' Although the nature of the
sentences imposed upon those convicted of crime has evoked con-
siderable criticism and many recommendations for reform,2 little
attention has been accorded to those provisions that deprive con-
victs of their civil rights. The statutory provisions governing the
1. No precise definition of "civil rights" is generally recognized. Some
distinguish between civil and political rights. See, e.g., People ex rel. Malley
v. Barrett, 203 Ill. 99, 104, 67 N.E. 742, 743-44 (1903). Others define
civil rights broadly to include all "rights which are an outgrowth of civiliza-
tion." Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87, 88, 219 Pac. 700, 701 (1923). Fi-
nally, civil rights have been defined as those rights bestowed by positive
law. Green v. State, 251 App. Div. 108, 110, 295 N.Y. Supp. 672, 674
(1937).
2. See, e.g., Symposium on Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CONTMiP.
PROB. 583 (1958); Radzinowicz, Changing Attitude Towards Crime and
Punishment, 75 L.Q. REV. 381 (1959).
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eventual restoration of civil rights to the convict upon his release
have been similarly neglected.
Congress has provided for the loss of certain rights upon the
conviction of specified federal offenses. For example, conviction of
treason results in the loss of United States citizenship;3 the convic-
tion for numerous other federal offenses deprives the convict of
the right to hold an office of "honor, or profit, under the United
States." This Note, however, is concerned solely with depriva-
tions of civil rights imposed by state statutes.5 These statutes, as
well as the methods of eventual restoration of the state convict's
civil rights, will be analyzed in light of their practical effectiveness
and their soundness under contemporary concepts of criminal
law and penology.
I. DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS DURING
IMPRISONMENT
A. CIVIL DEATH STATUTES
When a sentence was imposed upon a convicted felon under
the English common law, he was not only declared civilly dead, but
through the doctrine of corruption of blood, he became unable to
transfer his estate to his heirs, and through forfeiture his property
passed to the crown.6 By 1870, however, the English had elimi-
nated the common-law rules of forfeiture of property and corrup-
tion of blood.7 In the United States, these rules are prohibited by
the federal constitution8 and are proscribed by many state consti-
tutions and statutes.9 Although civil death has never been con-
3. 68 Stat. 1146 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1958).
4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 206 (1958) (bribery of judicial officers); 18 U.S.C.
§ 202 (1958) (acceptance or solicitation of a bribe by a public officer);
accord, 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1958) (rebellion or insurrection).
5. Since this Note is limited to an analysis of the effect of state stat-
utes, no consideration will be given to the rights afforded convicts under
state and federal constitutions. For an excellent discussion of this area, see
Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962).
6. See Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 324, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888);
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*336, *380-89; 1 CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW *723. Civil death resulted in an
"extinction of civil rights, more or less complete." Avery v. Everett, supra at
324, 18 N.E. at 150. However, civil death apparently did not cause the
felon's property to pass to his heirs as if he were in fact dead. See Rex v. The
Inhabitants of Haddenham, 15 East 463, 465, 104 Eng. Rep. 918, 919 (K.
B. 1812).
7. Art Act To Take Away Corruption of Blood Save in Certain Cases,
1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; An Act To Abolish Forfeitures for Treason and
Felony and To Otherwise Amend the Law Relating Thereto, 1870, 33 & 34
Vict., c. 23.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16; ME.
836
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sidered part of the American common law,10 several states have
statutes providing for some variation of civil death." Civil death
under the English common law apparently was designed to aug-
ment the infamy and ignominy that was traditionally attached to
the conviction of a felony, but the enactment of civil death stat-
utes in the United States was motivated more by the objective of
public security-the policy that life convicts should not be allow-
ed to exercise rights that could endanger public safety.
The specific disabilities imposed by the civil death statutes vary
greatly from state to state. A few statutes simply provide for the
convict's civil death;'3 many others, in addition, deprive the con-
vict of specific rights, such as the right to vote and the right to
hold public office.'4 Additional qualifications and other explana-
tions of the civil death penalty are occasionally found Within the
civil death statutes themselves' 5 or in other legislation.'" Gen-
erally, if a civil death statute is invoked, the convict will lose com-
mercial rights, such as the right to enter legally enforceable con-
CONST. art. 1, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; CAL. PEN. CODE § 2604;
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 512.
10. See Willingham v. King, 23 Fla. 478, 481, 2 So. 851, 853 (1887);
Department of Welfare v. Brock, 306 Ky. 243, 247, 206 S.W.2d 915, 917
(1947); Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 565, 213 N.W. 809, 812 (1927);
Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968, 969-70 (1937); Note, 37 VA. L. REV.
105, 106 (1951).
11. ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.080 (1962);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 2601;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-311 (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118
(1949); MINN. STAT. 610.34 (1961); Mo. REV. STAT. § 222.010 (1959);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4721 (1947); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 511;
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 66
(1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1
(1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-137 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7005 (1958); cf. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 83-38 (1955).
12. See Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, in
NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE AS'N 1952 YEARBOOK, CRIME PREVEN-
TION THROUGH TREATMENT 86, 90-91. There is no legislative history avail-
able to explain the purpose of civil death statutes. Another possible purpose
for such legislation could have been to facilitate the administration of
penal institutions; the deprivation of the civil rights could conceivably
minimize the amount of interference a convict could make in the prison
routine.
13. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-311 (1947); MINN. STAT. § 610.34
(1961).
14. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2601; Mo. REV. STAT. § 560.610 (1959);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
15. E.g., civil death "must not be construed to render . . . (life con-
victs] incompetent as witnesses upon the trial of a criminal action or pro-
ceeding, or incapable of making and acknowledging a sale or convey-
ance of property." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-312 (1948).
16. E.g., N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW § 152 (unpardoned felons denied the right
to vote).
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tracts17 and the right to pursue a licensed business or profession. 8
He may also be denied certain personal rights-his marriage may
be terminated despite his or his spouse's wishes' 9 and his natural
children may be placed for adoption without his knowledge or con-
sent.2" His property rights may be severely restricted. In a few
civil death states, sentence and imprisonment for life will auto-
matically result in the distribution of the convict's property to his
"heirs.' In Alabama, the life convict must make and publish
his last will within six months after his sentencing,22 and failure to
do so will cause his property to descend to his "heirs" through
intestacy.22 Finally, the convict's access to the courts may be
severely restricted. Although the convict is allowed to finish any
civil actions commenced before conviction,24 he will thereafter be
denied the right to bring a civil suit.25 Despite this inability to initi-
ate litigation, the convict nevertheless remains amenable to suit.
20
Moreover, only a few civil death jurisdictions toll the running of
17. While a majority of the civil death jurisdictions permit the life
convict to enter contracts binding upon him, they do not permit him to en-
force a contract. See, e.g., Stephani v. Lent, 30 Misc. 346, 349, 63 N.Y.
Supp. 471, 473 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Grasser v. Jones, 102 Ore. 214, 218, 201
Pac. 1069, 1071 (1921). Statutes in a few states specifically provide that a
convict is capable of making or acknowledging a sale or conveyance of
property. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-312 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4722 (1947); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-06-27 (1960). These statutes, however, have been
interpreted to limit the life convict's right to make contracts exclusively to
transactions involving real property. See, e.g., Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D.
463, 467, 253 N.W. 437, 439 (1934). A few other states simply seem to
deny the convict any right to contract. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 607:8 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956).
18. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
19. "The sentence of ... imprisonment for life and confinement un-
der it dissolves the bonds of matrimony; without legal process .... "
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 166, § 51 (1954). In New York, the marital rela-
tionship is terminated under the general language of the civil death stat-
ute. See In the Matter of Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907
(1942).
20. In the Matter of Anonymous, 17 Misc. 2d 691, 187 N.Y.S.2d 870
(Surr. Ct. 1959).
21. E.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 83-38 (1955) (property given to or ac-
cruing to a life convict vests in his "heirs"); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 13-6-7 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7005 (1958).
22. See ALA. COD tit. 61. S A (I Q60)
23. Wilkerson v. Moorer, 267 Ala. 296, 101 So. 2d 287 (1958); Holmes
v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1027)
24. Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246 (1884). See generally Note, 50
HARV. L. REV. 968, 972 n.2 7 (1937)
25. See, e.g., Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922).
But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-38 (11)531
26. E.g., Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 Pac. 482 (1899).
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the statute of limitations during the life convict's period of impris-
onment.17
B. STATUTES SUSPENDING CIL RIGHTS
Most of the civil death states have enacted legislation providing
for the blanket suspension of civil rights of those sentenced to pris-
on for a term of years." In those states having both civil death
and suspension of rights provisions, these statutes will apparently
be interpreted in pari materia; if a person sentenced to life impris-
onment retains a particular right, a person sentenced for a term of
years will retain that right also.2 9
Under a general suspension provision, a convict clearly will
lose his right to bring a civil suit during the term of his imprison-
ment30 although this is mitigated by the fact that the statute of
limitations is tolled in varying degrees in all states having suspen-
sion statutes.3 What other rights are affected by the general sus-
pension provision is unclear because further language either in the
suspension statutes or in other statutes specifically deprives the con-
vict of particular rights. Thus, a convict may lose his right to vote,
not because of the blanket suspension of civil rights, but as a result
of additional specific language in the suspension statute32 or in
other statutory provisions.3 Similarly, a convict may clearly lose
27. ARJz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-305,--307 (1949).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.050 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1653 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310
(1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118 (1949); Mo. REV. STAT. § 222.010
(1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4720 (Cum. Supp. 1961);
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 510; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-06-27 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 65 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1953); S.D.
CODE § 13-0613 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-36 (1953). All of
these states except South Dakota also have civil death statutes. See note 11
supra. Frequently these statutes will specifically suspend the right to hold
public office or a position of public trust. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-4720 (Cumim. Supp. 1961).
29. See 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 174.
30. See Ex parte Maro, 248 P.2d 135 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Lip-
schultz v. State, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Hayes v.
State, 50 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1944); In re Weber's Estate, 165 Misc.
815, 1 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
31. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956) (statute tolled in
nonreal property actions for both life and nonlife convicts); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 328 (1956) (statute tolled in real property actions for 20
years if the term of the sentence is less than life); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 241-12 (1955) (statute tolled during term of sentence for nonlife con-
victs only). If a convict is imprisoned for a long period, suit brought after
the termination of his sentence may prove fruitless due to the death
or unavailability of parties and witnesses.
32. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (1956); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 510(a).
33. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 34-402 (1949); N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW § 152.
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his legal capacity to contract, not because of the suspension provi-
sion, but because other statutes so provide.34
C. THE APPLICATION OF CIVIL DEATH AND SUSPENSION
LEGISLATION
Because most civil death and suspension statutes purport to de-
prive convicts of all civil rights, courts are faced with countless
problems that arise from a literal application of these statutes.35
The lack of property rights of a "civilly dead" convict illustrates
this judicial dilemma. If a convict loses his property by descent be-
fore his actual death, he will retain no funds for such possible
future needs as legal expenses or support in the event of his pardon
or parole. Yet if a convict retains his property, he will be unable to
sue for injuries to the property or to enforce his contract rights
under either civil death or suspension statutes. Such problems are
equally apparent in the domestic relations area. If, upon impris-
onment, a life convict's property passes by will or intestacy, the
fact that his marriage is automatically terminated could preclude
his spouse from her marital share. Moreover, whether his spouse
is free to remarry is unclear. Finally, the problem arises whether
a "civilly dead" convict may be regarded as dead for the purposes
of collection of the proceeds of his life insurance policies.
Such considerations have forced the courts to engraft substantial
exceptions and to create alternatives to a literal interpretation of
civil death and suspension statutes. 6 In Avery v. Everett," an
early New York case, the Court of Appeals had to determine
whether the New York civil death statute divested a life convict
of his property upon imprisonment. The court held that civil death
did not result in the distribution of property, for if a life convict
could be sued during his imprisonment, he could not at the same
34. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 29-101 (1949) (those who have lost their civil
rights have no capacity to contract); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 11 (1961).35.
With living men regarded as dead, dead men returning to life, and
the same man considered alive for one purpose but dead for another,
the realm of legal fiction acquires a touch of the supernatural under
the paradoxical doctrine of civil death.
Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968 (1937).
36. In California, with the narrow exception of In re Bagwell, 26 Cal.
App. 2d 418, 79 P.2d 395 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938), where a convict
was denied a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of bringing a
civil action in his own behalf, no appellate court in this century has up-
held the deprivation of a convict's rights under the Ca'ifornia civil
death statute. See Comment, 26 So. CAL. L. REV. 425, 433 (1953).
37. 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888). See also In re Johnson, 184
Misc. 855, 56 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Surr. Ct. 1945), where the fact that deced-
ent's son was civilly dead did not preclude him from sharing in his father's
estate.
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time be "civilly dead" for the purpose of the distribution of his
property. Similarly, in Smith v. Becker," the Kansas Supreme
Court noted that unless the life convict were allowed to retain his
property during imprisonment, his release before natural death
could lead to the anomalous situation of his "living with heirs
who have inherited his property."39
Courts have also been reluctant to apply a literal interpreta-
tion of civil death statutes in cases involving insurance."' In Sul-
livan v. Prudential Ins. Co.," for example, the Maine court held
that civil death did not entitle the life convict to receive the pro-
ceeds of his life insurance policy. The court determined that the
risk covered by the insurance policy, which contained an implied
condition that the insured would do nothing to hasten the maturity
of the contract, was only for "a natural, actual death."
In McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,' the Missouri Supreme Court,
in effect, narrowly construed its suspension of rights statute by
broadly construing the provision permitting the appointment of a
trustee to handle the convict's estate during the suspension." In
that case, a convict's wife had obtained a divorce decree that
conveyed some of the convict's property to her but did not provide
for a trustee. The court held that the convict had a right to the
appointment of a trustee, and since none was appointed, the con-
vict could sue his former wife to set aside that part of the di-
vorce decree distributing his property. Similarly, a California court
held that the suspension of a convict's civil rights did not prevent
him from continuing a civil action that had begun prior to his con-
viction." The court noted that otherwise all of the defendant's
property could be subject to attachment in the action, and the de-
fendant-would be without relief for the term of the sentence no
matter how groundless the action."5
38. 62 Kan. 541, 64 Pac. 70 (1901).
39. Id. at 544, 64 Pac. at 71. See also Gray v. Stewart, 70 Kan.
429,,432, 78 Pac. 852, 853 (1904), where the court said that civil death
statutes must be strictly construed because they are "in derogation of the
natural rights of persons to hold and manage their own property."
40. See Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d
544 (1952); Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Me. 228, 160
Ati. 777 (1932); Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125 Misc. 670, 211
N.Y. Supp. 755 (Sup. CL 1925), affirming 122 Misc. 136, 203 N.Y. Supp.
173. (Brooklyn Munic. Ct. 1923); Comment, 26 So. CAL. L. REV. 425, 433
(1953).
41. 131 Me. 228, 160 AUt. 777 (1932). The action was brought by the
administrator of the convict's estate, appointed pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat.
ch. 154, § 20 (1954), repealed by Me. Laws ch. 276 (1959).
42. 228 Mo. 635, 129 S.W. 21 (1910).
43. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 9229 (1939), repealed by Mo. Laws 1333 (1945).
44. Castera v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 694, 159 Pac. 735 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1916).
45. California continues to follow a narrow interpretation of its suspen-
1963]
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Despite the efforts of the courts to alleviate the harshness of
civil death and suspension statutes, the convict and his family must
proceed in a state of uncertainty and confusion. This problem is
illustrated in a New York case in which the wife of a convict sen-
tenced to life imprisonment sought a declaratory order that she
was free to remarry.46 The husband defended on the ground that
the chances of parole make life imprisonment unlikely. Neverthe-
less, the court interpreted the civil death statute strictly in this
case and awarded the declaratory order to the wife. This action by
the wife was probably prompted by the fact that she felt that the
unclear state of the law made any reliance on the civil death stat-
ute unwise in light of the possibility that she might be charged
with bigamy or adultery. In such a situation, a statute allowing
imprisonment of a spouse as a ground for divorce would seem
clearly preferable to the uncertain effects of the civil death stat-
ute.4
7
D. EVALUATION OF CIVIL DEATH AND SUSPENSION STATUTES
The soundness of civil death and suspension statutes should be
evaluated in light of the current emphasis on rehabilitation of the
convict to enable his eventual return to constructive participa-
tion in society, in lieu of punishment or retribution, as the pri-
mary goal of modern penology.4" Even when narrowly construed,
the blanket provisions of civil death and suspension statutes hardly
sion of rights statute. See In re McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531, 301 P.2d
385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); cf. note 37 supra.
46. Brookman v. Brookman, 161 Misc. 741, 292 N.Y.S. 918 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
47. Under present New York law, the only ground for divorce is adul-
tery. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT §§ 1147-60. Other civil death states, however,
specifically provide for divorce on the ground of imprisonment of a
spouse. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.06(4) (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-1(6) (1953). The Supreme Court of Alabama has interpreted its civil
death statute in pari materia with a statute providing that a sentence of
"seven years or longer" is cause for divorce; the court held that the leg-
islature did not intend that civil death should automatically dissolve the
marital status. Graham v. Graham, 251 Ala. 124, 36 So. 2d 316 (1948);
accord, Villalon v. Bowen, 70 Nev. 456, 273 P.2d 409 (1954).
48. See, e.g., Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 226 (1959); Tappan, The Legal Rights of
Prisoners, Annals, May, 1954, p. 99.
The swing of the penological pendulum from punishment to reforma-
tion during the last two hundred years was the result of the slow rec-
ognition that lawbreakers, like other human beings, can profit by
experience and training . . . . Society has invested colossal sums in,
and has committed itself to, the belief that a considerable majority of
offenders can be reformed.
GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 263 (1959). See also BLOCK & GEIs,
MAN, CRIME & SOCIETY 496 (1962); BOK, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL
LAW 73 (1955).
subserve this rehabilitative purpose.4 9 The automatic dissolution of
the life convict's marriage, for example, may adversely affect his
morale, thus lessening his chances for rehabilitation and parole.
Similar objections may be raised against the indiscriminate depriv-
ation of the convict's property rights. Where, as in Alabama, a
convict's property is distributed to his "heirs" upon his imprison-
ment for life, rehabilitation may be substantially retarded by the
convict's awareness that in the event of his pardon or parole he
would be penniless. A similar result may ensue when a convict
loses his property through his inability to protect it from the en-
croachments of third parties."'
In lieu of outright repeal of civil death and suspension of rights
legislation, a few states have attempted merely to alleviate the in-
ability of the convict to protect his property interests. To relieve
the convict's family and creditors from the hardships created by
the disabilities imposed on the convict, these states have enacted
statutes providing for the appointment of a committee or a trustee
to maintain the prisoner's estate, prosecute his claims, and defend
suits brought against him.52 The New York statute53 is represen-
tative of this type of legislation. Whenever any person is sentenced
either to life imprisonment or for a term of years, his relatives or
creditors may apply for the appointment of a committee for the
management of his estate. The court may direct payment of the
convict's debts, provide for support and education of his depend-
ents, and supervise sale of the convict's property and investment of
the proceeds. If the convict should be pardoned or his sentence
commuted, the committee will be ordered to transfer all of the re-
maining property to him.
These statutes are unsatisfactory, however, because they ap-
pear to have been designed for the benefit of creditors and depend-
ents with little concern for the interests of the convict.' The
convict has no control over the committee's actions. The commit-
tee may never come into existence because the creditors and rela-
tives may not undertake to have one appointed or there may be no
creditors or relatives; the convict himself is not authorized to ask
49. See Note, 48 YALE L.J. 912, 916 (1939). See also Note, 13 WYo. LJ.
62, 67 (1958).
50. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
52. ME. REV. STAT. ch. 158, § 4 (1954); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 460.010-
460.250 (1956); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 320-25, 350-61; R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §§ 13-6-4 to 13-6-7 (1956).
53. N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 320-25, 350-61.
54. Such statutes were enacted when "no thought was given to whether
a convict should have property at the expiration of his sentence and
when palole was unknown." 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 180.
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for the appointment of a committee. Moreover, even if a committee
is appointed, it may fail to protect the convict's property; he may
have a cause of action against a third person, for example, but
the committee may neglect to bring suit on it.
The need to deprive a convict of a particular right may vary,
depending upon whether the rehabilitative effect of the retention
of that right and the concept of doing justice to the convict and his
family outweigh the interests in maintaining community safety and
avoiding undue public inconvenience. The omnibus provisions of
civil death and suspension of rights statutes fail to recognize the
necessity of balancing these factors. This type of analysis may be
illustrated by considering the right to sue. The principal objections
to allowing a prisoner to bring a civil suit are: (1) prisoners may
try to instigate litigation to be temporarily absent from prison;
(2) they may exercise poor judgment in deciding whether to
sue-acts that would normally be overlooked may assume a dis-
torted importance in the mind of a prisoner; (3) they may harass
public officials with countless lawsuits. 5 The first objection could
be met by entrusting the conduct of the lawsuit to the convict's
attorney and allowing the convict's testimony to be taken by depo-
sition.56 The other objections are not so easily overcome. Unwar-
ranted civil actions arising out of the arrest, prosecution, and con-
finement of the prisoner could be so numerous and expensive as
to interfere materially with the performance of an official's du-
ties.57 However, the fact that the majority of states have appar-
ently not deemed it necessary to deny the convict access to the
courts for civil suits" may indicate that such problems are not
overly burdensome. In addition, other considerations tend to weigh
in favor of the retention of the right to sue. Vindication of the
convict's rights in court may enable him to secure some degree of
economic protection for his dependents and clearly should not en-
danger public safety. Moreover, permitting the convict to sue may
prevent the unjust enrichment of third party debtors who occasion-
ally benefit from the convict's inability to reach them. 59 Accord-
55. See 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 190.
56. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-604 (1955).
57. See 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 189. This problem might
be partially alleviated by the use of court injunctions against a prisoner's
repetitious or overly vexatious litigation in the same fashion that injunc-
tions are occasionally issued against other harassing lawsuits. Cf. Cliett v.
Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (1962), where the court upheld a contempt ci-
tation for violation of an injunction prohibiting further litigation over the
ownership and possession of certain land.
58. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
59.
[The loss of the right to sue] seems to be without justification today.
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ingly, the balancing of these factors favoring the convict's right
to sue against the fact that the objections on the grounds of public
inconvenience do not seem insurmountable indicates that jus-
tice would be best served by allowing the convict to retain the
right to bring a civil suit.
This balancing test, incorporating both the policy of rehabilita-
tion and the need for community protection, is best utilized by
proceeding right-by-right, the approach apparently adopted by those
states that have statutes depriving a convict of such specific rights
as the right to vote,6" to hold positions of public trust,0 ' and to
engage in a profession or business requiring a license., Since
the common-law disabilities are apparently inapplicable in the ab-
sence of civil death or suspension of rights legislation,' the con-
vict would retain those civil rights not specifically proscribed by
statute. Thus, in these states a life convict's property will not be
distributed among his heirs upon imprisonment and his marriage
will not be automatically terminated; in addition, he will probably
retain other property rights,64 including the right to contract and
to bring suit.65
That convicts in these states retain the right to sue and to con-
tract may improve the convict's chances for rehabilitation by al-
lowing him to protect his property and thus insure a means of live-
lihood in the event of his release or parole. On the other hand, the
rights that more directly affect community life and involve poten-
tial harm to society have been rightly withheld from the impris-
It cannot be supported as a deterrent to crime. It may give a windfall
to debtors, and it may inflict an unmerited punishment on innocent
third persons, namely, on the dependents of the person sentenced and
his heirs.
6 U. Cm. L. REV. 288, 288-89 (1939).
60. E.g., W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Wis. CONsT. art. 3, § 2;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1048 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-3 (1953);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4 (1957).
61. E.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 2; N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 8;
N.M. STAT. ANN.. § 5-1-2 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 310 (1961);
WIS. STAT. § 17.03 (1961).
62. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-294 (1958) (architect's certifi-
cate); WAsH. REV. CODE § 18.04.300 (Supp. 1961) (accountant's license);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2855 (1961) (attorney's license).
63. See Willingham v. King, 23 Fla. 478, 481, 2 So. 851, 853 (1887);
Note, 50 HARv. L. REV. 968, 969-70 (1937).
64. See Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888), where a wo-
man imprisoned for life was allowed to take her dower interest in her hus-
band's estate; Hine v. Simon, 95 Okla. 86, 218 Pac. 1072 (1923), where
a life convict was allowed to inherit land. See also Davis v. Laning, 85
Tex. 39, 19 S.W. 846 (1892).
65. E.g., Department of Welfare v. Brock, 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915
(1947); Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 213 N.W. 809 (1927); Haynes
v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 100 S.E. 471 (1919).
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oned convict. For example, a convict will be deprived of his right
to vote,16 possibly to avoid the danger that bribes might be offered
to the wardens delivering the greatest number of votes to a particu-
lar political party.
II. RESTORATION OF RIGHTS
Equally as confusing and diverse as the statutes depriving the
convict of his civil rights are the methods by which those rights are
eventually restored to him. In a few states, certain rights may be
restored to the convict upon parole. In the great majority of states,
however, rights are restored when the convict is released by par-
don; they may also be restored at the termination of his sentence,
either automatically or through a certificate of good conduct.
A. PAROLE
The placing of the convict on parole generally does not restore
the civil rights he lost as a result of his imprisonment.6" In effect,
a parolee continues to serve his sentence even though he is no
longer imprisoned; the sentence is not suspended, and he remains
in the legal custody of the state." There are some exceptions to
this general rule. New York, for example, has amended its sus-
pension statutes to allow a convict on parole to bring suit.6" Stat-
utes in a few other states permit the paroled convict to exercise
all nonpolitical civil rights. 0 Although these statutes do not de-
fine either political or nonpolitical civil rights, presumably the for-
mer term would include the right to vote and to hold public office,
and the latter would probably encompass the rights to contract
or to bring suit.
Parole has the double function of rehabilitating the offender and
protecting society from his possible further transgressions. 7 The
extent of the restoration of civil rights to a parolee will be resolved
in terms of one of these two functions. Where the sole interest is in
community protection, emphasis will be on rigid surveillance of
the parolee and restriction of his rights. However, if the policy of
66. See note 60 supra.
67. See In re Sutton, 50 Mont. 88, 94, 145 Pac. 6, 8 (1914); Note, 37
VA. L. REV. 105, 115 (1951).
68. E.g., State ex rel. Lampi v. Tahash, 261 Minn. 310, 112 N.W.2d 357
(1961); People ex rel. Natoli v. Lewis, 287 N.Y. 478, 41 N.E.2d 62
(1942); Crooks v. Sanders, 123 S.C. 28, 115 S.E. 760 (1922); Scott v.
Chichester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S.E. 95 (1908).
69. N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 510-11.
70. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310 (1948); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240
(1953).
71. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PARDONS 174
(1958).
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rehabilitation is stressed, the community may become endangered
by the parolee's excesses and misconduct.72 Clearly, some control
over the parolee is necessary to protect the community and to pre-
vent his return to crime. Thus, in most states the parolee must ob-
tain permission to borrow money or change jobs, and he is prohibit-
ed from associating with other parolees or ex-convicts. 7 The re-
habilitative purpose of parole, however, may be enhanced without
burdening or endangering society by restoring to the parolee some
of the civil rights forfeited because of imprisonment. Although
sound policy may justify the prohibition of an imprisoned con-
vict's right to vote, such a restriction is more difficult to justify in
the case of the parolee since the danger of prisoners becoming
embroiled in political struggles is no longer present.74 In addition,
the exercise of the franchise by the parolee may hasten his inte-
gration into normal community affairs. The rehabilitative purpose
may smilarly be served by restoring the right to sue. The harrass-
ing or vexatious lawsuits that might result from prison confine-
ment75 should be less likely once the prisoner is released and be-
comes involved in normal community pursuits. Moreover, permit-
ting the parolee to protect his personal and property interests in the
courts may encourage him to accept responsibility for the mainte-
nance of himself and his family. The New York Law Revision
Commission, in recommending the passage of the present New
York suspension statute, noted that the parole system was devised
long after the statute on suspension of civil rights was adopted and
that the prohibition against the right to sue in the case of the pa-
rolee was "attributable to accident rather than intention." '76
B. PARDON
The majority of states make some provision for the granting of
pardons. The pardon power may be vested simply in the governor
alone,77 in the governor aided by an advisory board,78 or solely
in the advisory board.79 Although a pardon could completely
72. Id. at 175.
73. 4 ATr'Y GEN. SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 212-13 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as SURVEY]; Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 309, 311-12
(1951).
74. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
75. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
76. 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 194.
77. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104-1/2, § 1 (1961); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 692; ORE. REV. STAT. 143.010 (Supp. 1961).
78. E.g., MASS. ANN.'LAws c. 127, § 152 (Supp. 1962); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 71, § 299 (1962).
79. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-24a, 18-26 (1960); MINN. STAT.
§ 638.01 (1961).
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erase a conviction and exonerate the convict of all punishment,8"
such a broad interpretation of the effect of a pardon has not
been applied in practice. While certain rights are almost always re-
stored to the pardoned convict-the right to sue,8 the right to
contract, 2 the right to vote, 3 and the right to inherit and convey
property84-a pardon will not necessarily erase all the effects of
the conviction. A license to engage in certain businesses or profes-
sions may be withheld;85 a forfeited office need not be restored;8"
marriages terminated by conviction are not reinstated nor is the
spouse's right to a divorce based on the conviction destroyed. 7
Moreover, the pardoned convict cannot regain property interests
that have vested in third parties as a result of the conviction.88
The primary purpose of the pardon is not to serve as a
method of restoring civil rights, but rather as a means of official
clemency designed to release certain prisoners subsequently deter-
mined to be innocent or otherwise unjustly imprisoned." In
80. The United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333, 380 (1867), announced a liberal definition of "pardon":
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and
the guilt of the offender; . . . it releases the punishment and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence . . . . [I]t
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores to him all his civil
rights ....
81. White v. State, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1940), a/I'd,
285 N.Y. 728, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1941); Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192
So. 205 (1938) (dictum).
82. 3 SURVEY at 280.
83. In the Matter of the Executive Communication, 14 Fla. 318 (1872);
Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ore. 568 (1870); 3 SURVEY at 272; Note, 37 VA.
L. REV. 105, 112 (1951). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-26
(1960).
84. 3 SURVEY at 271-72.
85. Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935); State v. Hazzard,
139 Wash. 487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926). In New York, the state Board of Re-
gents may in its discretion restore licenses to pardoned physicians and
dentists. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6502, 6613(13). The burden of vroof is on the
applicant to show good character. See Jablon v. Board of Regents, 271
App. Div. 369, 66 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1946).
86. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2-32 (1950); Morris v. Hartsfield, 186 Ga.
171, 197 S.E. 251 (1938); State ex rel. Webb v. Parks, 122 Tenn. 230,
122 S.W. 977 (1909); Commonwealth v. Fugate, 2 Leigh 724 (Va. 1830);
3 SURVEY at 273-74.
87. Hollaway v. Hollaway, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S.E. 191 (1906); 3 SURVEY
at 280; Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 105, 113 (1951). Where a pardon is granted
after the divorce, some statutes provide that the pardon does not vitiate the
divorce. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 247.07(3) (1961).
88. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867) (dictum); State
v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487, 492, 247 Pac. 957, 959 (1926); 3 SURVEY
at 279.
89. See Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, in
NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N 1952 YEARBOOK, CRIME PRE-
VENTION THROUGH TREATMENT 86, 97.
theory, then, the pardon should be used sparingly; it would not
affect those convicts who were properly convicted and impris-
oned. In practice, however, the pardoning power is often misused
as a substitute for parole;9" moreover, a predominating influence
in the granting of a pardon, especially where that authority is vest-
ed in the chief executive alone, is sometimes political.9 Thus, the
practical result of restoration of rights when a pardon is granted
may be to restore rights to those fortunate enough to receive a
pardon while still withholding rights from those who are paroled or
who have served their sentences.
C. RESTORATION THROUGH GOOD CONDUCT CERTIFICATES
Another method of restoring civil rights is through the use of a
good conduct certificate. Statutes restoring civil rights to the convict
on the basis of good conduct vary substantially, but there are two
general types. First, restoration may depend upon the convict's
compliance with prison regulations during his imprisonment. 2 In
Colorado, for example, a convict who has complied with prison
rules is entitled at the end of his sentence to a certificate of good
conduct from the warden; upon presentation of the certificate to
the governor, all of his civil rights are restored.9 z Second, the
statute may make the good conduct of the convict after his release
from prison determinative of the restoration of civil rights.' Thus,
in California, a convict released from prison, either by completion
of sentence or parole, may apply to the superior court for a certifi-
cate of rehabilitation and pardon after satisfactory conduct during
the parole period or for some other fixed period.9"
Neither variation of the "good conduct" method is entirely satis-
factory. Where the restoration rests on the good conduct of the
90. Ibid.
91. Scott, The Pardoning Power, Annals, Nov. 1952, pp. 95-100.
92. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 105-4-13 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT.
8 29-2634 (1943); S.D. CODE §13.4718 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-9-30 (1953); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-311 (1957).
93. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-4-13 (1953).
94. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 4852.01-.17; N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW
§ 242.
95. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 4852.01-.17. A description of the Cali-
fornia procedure may be "found in MacGregor, Adult Probation, Parole,
and Pardon in California, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 887, 908-13 (1960). Min-
nesota law provides for a variation of the two types of restoration through
a good conduct certificate. A convict who has completed his sentence is
certified by a judge or other appropriate official as being rehabilitated.
This certificate is forwarded to the Governor who has discretionary power
to restore the convict's civil rights. See MINN. STAT. §§ 610.41-.43 (1961).
In addition, MINN. STAT. § 243.18 (1961) provides that a prisoner who has
satisfactorily served his full term of imprisonment shall receive from the
Governor a certificate restoring his rights and privileges.
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convict prior to his release, the emphasis is on the convict's con-
formity to the patterns of prison life rather than on his ability to
withstand the temptations and fulfill the demands of living in the
community. In some cases, the best behaved inmate may be an
habitual offender; hardened criminals may live within the prison
rules only to secure the earliest possible release.96 This problem,
of course, is not present where the emphasis is upon the convict's
conduct after his release from prison. In the latter case, however,
because the burden is on the convict to secure a certificate of re-
habilitation or good conduct, many eligible convicts fail to apply
and thus are denied their civil rights. Apparently they do not wish
to risk embarrassment by an investigation into their past record,
or they fear loss of employment upon discovery by their employers
of their past prison records.9"
D. AUTOMATIC RESTORATION
Several states provide for automatic restoration of the convict's
civil rights, generally either upon the completion of the sentence"8
or upon the expiration of a period of time after the convict's re-
lease.99 The clearest example of this type of legislation may be
found in the Wisconsin statute, which provides that every convict
"obtains a restoration of his civil rights by serving out his term
of imprisonment or otherwise satisfying his sentence."' Many of
the automatic restoration statutes provide for an earlier restoration
of rights for a convict on parole who has received a discharge from
the parole board or its equivalent.'
Frequently, these statutes make no provision for informing
96. See Tappan, supra note 89, at 97-98.
97. See Wallerstein, Testing Opinion on Causes of Crime, 28 Focus
103, 106-07 (1949).
98. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2252 (Supp. 1961); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2965.17 (Supp. 1962); WIs. STAT. § 57.078 (1961). The Pro-
posed Minn. Criminal Code adopts the principle of automatic restoration.
Under this proposal, all civil rights except the right to hold public office,
which is forfeited forever upon conviction of bribery, are automatically
restored when the convict completes his sentence or is discharged by the
Adult Corrections Commission. PROPOSED MINN. CRIMINAL CODE § 609.-
165 (1962).
99. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 216.355 (1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.371
(1955). The Missouri statute applies only to the first conviction for a felony
and then only if the convict obtains a certificate of discharge from the
parole board.
100. WIS. STAT. § 57.078 (1961). This statute was enacted primarily to
restore franchise rights. See Note, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 358; cf. Brossard,
Restoration of Civil Rights, 1946 Wis. L. REV. 281.
101. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2252 (Supp. 1961); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2965.17 (Supp. 1962).
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the released prisoner of the fact that his rights are restored. -
Thus, a released prisoner could fail to exercise his re-acquired
rights simply because he was unaware that any rights were restor-
ed to him. 1°3 Since the interation of released prisoners into com-
munity life is desirable, they should be encouraged to exercise those
rights that could facilitate their assimilation into normal civic and
business life, such as the right to vote and the right to contract.
The rehabilitation of the convict will probably be enhanced by
allowing him to renew active community participation with the few-
est possible formalities and procedural burdens."' Since automatic
restoration statutes return rights to anyone who has completed
his sentence, the community bears an implied risk that the restored
convict may not be fully rehabilitated and that he may thus mis-
use his re-acquired rights. Yet it seems reasonable that if the con-
vict has served his full penalty, society should return him as fully
as possible to his former status. Moreover, this risk seems much less
dangerous than the chance that a convict on parole may commit
another crime, a risk freely taken by all states. In addition, under
automatic restoration, the convict is spared the embarrassment and
often unnecessary investigation demanded by statutes requiring
application to courts or administrative agencies.
CONCLUSION
In approximately one-third of the states, civil death and sus-
pension of rights statutes deprive convicted felons of some or all
of their civil rights. Such statutes are imprecise and result in uncer-
tainty and confusion for the courts and the convict alike. More-
over, they tend to hamper the rehabilitative process. Those states
still having civil death and suspension statutes should "reassess the
value to be gained from attaching an indefinite, perhaps perma-
nent, disability to the crime.' ' 05 Such a re-evaluation should re-
sult in the repeal of civil death and suspension of rights legislation;
these states should consider the deprivation of each particular right
as a separate and distinct problem, a process at least impliedly
adopted by the majority of states. In deciding whether a convict
should be deprived of a certain right, community protection and
convenience should be balanced against the ideal of doing justice
to the individual convict and the possible adverse effect the depriva-
tion of that right would have upon his rehabilitation.
102. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2965.17 (Supp. 1962); Wis.
STAT. § 57.078 (1961).
103. Cf. Wallerstein, supra note 97, at 107.
104. See PROPOSED MINN. CRIMINAL CODE § 609.165, comment (1962).
105. See Widdifield, The State Convict 181 (1952) (unpublished SJ.D.
dissertation in Yale Law School Library).
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In addition, those states that do not provide automatic restora-
tion of civil rights to convicts should do so. This method of restor-
ing rights encourages the more frequent exercise of civil rights by
ex-convicts; it avoids the embarrassing investigation and publicity
of the good conduct certificate and provides the convict with no-
tice that his rights are restored. This increased opportunity for a
released prisoner to exercise the civil rights available to other citi-
zens should be a definite aid in his rehabilitation.
